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Abstract  
This essay analyses international stabilization missions as contemporary forms of crisis 
management in conflict and post-conflict environments. While maintaining some similarities 
and differences, ‘stabilization has emerged as an alternative approach to ‘peacebuilding’ and 
‘statebuilding’ for certain governments engaged in international military operations. Drawing 
from Philipp Rotmann’s ‘stabilization-as-crisis-management’, the essay proceeds with an 
analysis of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and its three primary chronological phases of 
operation. Rotmann’s concept serves as an analytical framework to evaluate successes and 
failures of Canada’s twelve-and-a-half-year mission which ended in 2014. This essay 
concludes that Canada’s application of stabilization was  broader than the crisis management’ 
approach and with its broad scope and was therefore unable to accomplish many of the goals 
to stabilize Afghanistan. 
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Analysing Stabilization and Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan 
 Introduction 
      At the end of February 2020, the United States began historic political talks with the 
Taliban leadership in Afghanistan aimed at reducing violence over a seven-day period with 
an end goal of withdrawing all US and coalition forces from the country within 14 months 
(What’s in Blue, 2020). These historic talks occurring at time of great turmoil in Afghanistan 
signify the ongoing complexity and challenges faced by the United States and its allies within 
the country. For the United States’ northern neighbour, Canada, their chapter in Afghanistan 
ended in 2014 after a twelve-and-a-half-year mission beginning in 2001 (Boucher & Nossal, 
2017). Though comparatively smaller in terms of its military size and capability in the early 
2000s, Canada and its armed forces provided military personnel, financial aid and guidance 
to Afghanistan and bore more than their fair share weight of the operation for a country of its 
size (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 14). It is here where the interest in Canada’s involvement in 
Afghanistan stems from and why it has been chosen as subject for this study.  
         The concept of stabilization has become a common term used to describe international 
involvement missions like Afghanistan. This essay will use the term involvement throughout 
as opposed to similar terms such as intervention or assistance. While all three are relatively 
interchangeable and have overlapping definitions, ‘international involvement’ appears more 
often in the literature that has examined international stabilization missions which is a central 
focus of this essay. An examination of how stabilization has been conceptualized will be 
integral to studying Canada’s mission, from start to finish. This essay will first unpack 
stabilization and similar concepts such as ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘statebuilding’ to situate 
stabilization in a broader analytical context. Beginning with the work of Charles Call and 
Elizabeth Cousens (2008), peacebuilding and statebuilding will be fleshed out to lay the 
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groundwork for an exploration of how stabilization is described in its contemporary form by 
Philipp Rotmann (2016) and likeminded scholars. Of interest in Rotmann’s analysis is the 
manner in which he begins by explaining stabilization’s early history more closely associated 
with peacebuilding. He then transitions to its contemporary form, centred around crisis 
management. With this, his concluding explanation of stabilization will provide a lens to be 
used to evaluate Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. The mission will be examined thereafter 
beginning in 2001 with Operation Apollo followed by part two with Operation Athena, both 
with the initial phase in Kabul and the follow-up period in Kandahar Province where the bulk 
of Canada’s mission took place. It is here where the integral report by the Independent Panel 
on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (2008) chaired by John Manley, former Canadian 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs will be investigated to showcase the 
shift in priority for the Canadian Government in Afghanistan from a broad to a narrowed and 
more focused mission finishing up with the final stages of Canada’s participation in the 
conflict.  
           The reality of Canada’s Afghan commitment was different than that which was 
presented to the public and even in the years after Canada’s departure from the country, the 
way in which Canada choses to remember its role in the conflict is often blurred (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017 and Brewster, 2019). Canada began its mission in Afghanistan with a broad, all-
encompassing approach to the stabilization of the country and upon recommendations from 
the independent panel, Canada began to narrow down its approach to the mission. However, 
due to an inability to control the security situation within Kandahar Province and Afghanistan 
as a whole, Canada ended its mission without having successfully stabilized the country to a 
point where they could withstand political shock independent of foreign assistance. 
Afghanistan’s situation will continue to be precarious even after decades of foreign 
involvement however, Canada’s mission as it has officially been concluded since 2014, can 
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continue to be subject to intense examination to further understand if the blood, sweat and 
dollars were worth it. 
           This essay will begin by conceptualizing stabilization. It will examine stabilization as 
a broad form of peacebuilding followed by a brief exploration of how the term relates to 
statebuilding. Following this initial overview, the essay will describe how stabilization was 
used in a narrowed down form to fit a model of crisis management. This model was less 
encompassing than the original conceptualization of stabilization as peacebuilding. A second 
section following the conceptualization of stabilization will provide a chronology of 
Canadian involvement in Afghanistan beginning with Operation Apollo for the early stages 
of the mission transitioning to the more cumbersome part two with Operation Athena in 
2003. Within Operation Athena, key events such as government transitions, the equipment 
situation and the ever-important Manley Report will be explored in depth to better understand 
this phase of Canada’s mission. The last portion of this section will focus on Canada’s final 
phase, Operation Attention between 2011 and 2014. The final section of this essay will 
combine both the conceptualization of stabilization and the chronology of Canada’s mission 
in Afghanistan. The stabilization mission will be broken apart to indicate whether it fits the 
mould of stabilization as a form of crisis management. This will provide a lens through which 
an assessment of the successes and failures of Canada’s involvement is offered.  
Conceptualizing Stabilization 
   In order to understand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) stabilization 
mission in Afghanistan, Canada’s role in the country and in Kandahar Province more 
specifically, it is essential to first understand what is generally meant by the concept of 
‘stabilization’ as it pertains to contemporary forms of international involvement.  An 
examination of the key components of what constitutes stabilization in a contemporary 
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context will be required to fully engage in an analysis of Canada’s participation in the 
development and stabilization of Afghanistan as a whole and, in particular, their leading role 
in Kandahar Province. As will be unpacked further, early forms of stabilization shared 
commonalities with ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘statebuilding’. Beginning with the work of Charles 
Call and Elizabeth Cousens (2008), both peacebuilding and statebuilding will be fleshed out 
to display the international involvement family tree and further understand how stabilization 
resembles and differs from these two terms. The work of Philipp Rotmann (2016) and others 
will be used to sharpen the distinction between older versions of stabilization as it related to 
peacebuilding to show how its contemporary usage has narrowed its scope. As a critique of 
this approach, Roger Mac Ginty’s Against Stabilisation (2012) will be examined to consider 
the arguments marshalled against the contemporary understanding of stabilization and its new 
narrowed version. Conclusively however for this paper, stabilization’s narrow approach, 
though less encompassing and focusing on security action over supporting overall 
humanitarian aid and development, allows for a more practical version of stabilization in that 
its margin for success is less expansive and encompassing. 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
          The order of agenda for breaking down stabilization will require an examination of 
comparable terms of international involvement. Beginning with ‘peacebuilding’, Call and 
Cousens trace the roots of this term back to the 1990s as a post-conflict term focused 
primarily on preventative measures for potential conflict (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 3). 
Peacebuilding emerged during this time as one of the dominant terms encompassing a broad 
range of actions taken by international actors to institutionalize peace (Call & Cousens, 2008, 
pg. 3). Through its wide range and varying levels of application, peacebuilding itself has 
taken many forms and with this as Call and Cousens have posited, there exists no universally 
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agreed upon definition of the term (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 4). Placed in this context, their 
own understanding of the term focuses on the institutionalization of peace leading to eventual 
absence of armed conflict (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 4). As it developed and the complexity 
of post-conflict arenas expanded, the term itself, in turn became more encompassing of the 
varying forms conflict prevention would take in a post-conflict society (Call & Cousens, 
2008, pg. 3). Because of the broad scope of the term, what Call and Cousens describes as the 
“no-agency-left-behind” approach, peacebuilding became all-encompassing with 
organizations and states bringing everything to the table to try and accomplish long lists of 
strategies and goals to institutionalize peace (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 3). With this, 
priorities and direction were often blurred and the road to lasting peace became increasingly 
unattainable (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 3).  
              Achieving the absence of armed conflict requires, as Call and Cousens remark, an 
effort to reinstitutionalize peace by both the international community and domestic parties 
(Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 4). To ‘reinstitutionalize peace’ is meant to create an ability to 
maintain the absence of armed conflict even after the departure of international involvement 
(Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 4). What Call and Cousens note as a challenge for peacebuilding 
is the wide range of indicators to be considered making a measurement or evaluation of 
success rather difficult (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 5). The authors note that peacebuilding 
can be seen as falling into one of three categories: maximalist, moderate and minimalist (Call 
& Cousens, 2008, pp. 6, 7). Firstly, with the maximalist standard, outlined as the standard 
often adopted by the United Nations Security Council, the root causes of conflict are the 
priority and with that, developmental, humanitarian, and political goals at the core of the 
society in conflict are prioritized (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 6). 
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           Call and Cousens subsequently present the opposite standard from maximalist, the 
minimalist approach which sets minimal criteria for peace, and a very basic standard for 
success, as simply the absence of conflict (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 7). The minimalist 
approach is marked by Call and Cousens as less manageable as there is no focus on structural 
or institutional development to ensure peace remains following the departure of international 
parties (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 7). Between the minimalist and maximalist categories, 
Call and Cousens identify a third ‘moderate’ approach to peacebuilding. In contrast to the 
minimalist model, the moderate approach has a more “demanding definition of success” (Call 
& Cousens, 2008, pg. 7). As a hybrid between the minimalist and maximalist standards for 
success, the moderate version incorporates both immediate measures to stem the reoccurrence 
of conflict as well as policy practices aimed at addressing root causes of conflict (Call & 
Cousens, 2008, pg. 8). Both the institutional and structural development elements of the 
maximalist approach are carried over to pursue lasting peace, however the less-encompassing 
aspect of the minimalist approach are also added as part of the focus of the moderate 
approach to peacebuilding. The moderate approach is seen as a more appropriate measure of 
success in evaluating peacebuilding efforts though still remains relatively untested (Call & 
Cousens, 2008, pg. 8). 
          The three divergent models for measuring the success of peacebuilding as laid out by 
Call and Cousens show the complexity and wide range of ways in which peacebuilding can 
be applied making it a complex topic to unpack (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 8). However, a 
key takeaway from Call and Cousens’ examination of peacebuilding is the role of domestic 
state institutions and establishing an atmosphere of self-sufficiency. They state that 
“rebuilding or establishing at least minimally functioning state institutions is essential to 
peacebuilding” (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9). This rebuilding process, referred to as 
statebuilding attempts to establish nationally recognized and legitimate institutions so that 
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when foreign security forces depart, the state will be able to prevent a relapse into armed 
conflict (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9). Call and Cousens remark that for some scholars, 
institutions like a judicial system, a police force, a parliamentary assembly, or economic 
agencies are key institutions that a state needs to prevent this relapse. They maintain 
however, that the core requirement for statebuilding and capacity building lies with 
institutions capable of adjudicating disputes between conflicting parties (Call & Cousens, 
2008, pg. 9). This takes the form of the state institutions being able to bring together 
conflicting parties to solve their problems without the use of violence. Whether it be done in 
the judiciary or a government assembly, this requirement is to ensure disputes are settled off 
the battlefield. This, as they point out, has not always been the focus of peacebuilding actors 
(Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9).  
            Historically, building the capacity of the state was not always the priority. State 
capacity was treated more as something assumed to be already present (Call & Cousens, 
2008, pg. 9). Any reshuffling or altering of the state’s domestic institutions was often left 
unaddressed by the international community (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9). However, 
international bodies and foreign states involving themselves in statebuilding efforts have at 
times taken on a more hands-on approach by taking the lead in governance reforms and 
building state capacity (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9). If successful these domestic 
institutions, which have received guidance and the tools for an increased capacity from 
international actors, are to contribute to the absence of armed conflict. The argument they 
advance is that with increased security capacity, state authorities are able to respond to 
disputes either in a more hands on way with police or military forces or in a more 
institutionalized manner by providing non-violent conflict resolution processes such as those 
offered by legitimate judiciaries (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9). All of these actions aimed at 
building self-sufficiency and capacity within a state complement the central goal of 
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peacebuilding, which is to pursue the absence of armed conflict and institutionalize peace as 
mentioned by Call and Cousens (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 10). 
            Shifting Stabilization 
      To examine more closely how notions of statebuilding evolved into other competing 
terms in recent decades, this section will turn to the work of Philipp Rotmann.1 Rotmann 
endeavours to make the distinction between two competing doctrines which he defines as 
‘stabilization-as-peacebuilding’ and ‘stabilization-as-crisis-management’ (Rotmann, 2016). 
Rotmann’s distinction draws from work he co-authored in 2013 with Lea Steinacker in a 
policy evaluation for the German Federal Foreign office which outlined stabilization policies 
from key NATO countries. The manner in which these countries identify fragility, stability 
and stabilization informs Rotmann’s conclusive definition of ‘stabilization’ as stabilization-
as-crisis-management. In defining these terms, Rotmann begins by noting that ‘stabilization’ 
has become a new “mainstream catch phrase for what to do when high levels of political 
volatility and violence lead to humanitarian and political crises in ‘some place,’” (Rotmann, 
2016, pg. 1). This new ‘catch phrase’ occupies a unique place in recent discussions on forms 
of international involvement as its implementation has begun a sort of mitosis to present two 
versions of itself (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 1). As detailed below, the first is considered to be the 
broader application of stabilization while the second is viewed as its narrower counterpart 
(Rotmann, 2016, pg. 7). Rotmann’s road to conceptualizing these concepts with Steinacker 
will later be examined to view how Rotmann and many key international actors have come to 
 
1 Rotmann’s piece not only provides a useful overview of the concept of stabilization, his work also offers a 
look into five NATO members, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
and how they perceive stabilization. As will be discussed in this essay, Rotmann examines how these states 
navigated recent decades by moving from a ‘stabilization-as-peacebuilding lens’ to ‘stabilization’ as it relates to 
crisis management (Rotmann 2016).  
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the conclusion that the narrow, stabilization-as-crisis-management is the form stabilization 
should embody. 
         As a broad approach to international involvement, stabilization-as-peacebuilding is 
described as an all-out effort to combat what is identified as elements of ‘fragility’ in a state 
(Rotmann, 2016, pg. 5). State fragility is often seen as associated with political instability, 
violence, and an inability for the state to provide effective services to its people (Rotmann, 
2016, pg. 5). Characteristics of this fragility are often social and economic inequality, poor 
governance and the presence of actors, ranging from street gangs to terrorists, who seek to 
foster violence (Muggah, 2010, pg. 34). From this perspective, the international involvement 
centred on stabilization aims to guide a state from its form of fragility to a stable political 
order. Rotmann presents this as a process of creating political systems that are legitimate and 
representative of the local population (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 5). Central to the goal of fostering 
greater legitimacy and representative forms of government is creating an environment in 
which the rule of law and human rights are held to the highest standard (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 
5). This broad approach, in an attempt to encompass a complete and total reconstruction of 
state institutions, aims to improve and increase the state’s capacity to govern itself, provide 
security for its population and foster economic development (Siegle, 2011, pp. 21-33). This 
process towards stability, referred to typically as stabilization is, as Rotmann explains an all-
encompassing ‘whole-of-government’ effort incorporating every level of bureaucracy, 
military and police, and uninterrupted over a period of time (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 5). 
Rotmann’s critique of this broad approach to stabilization lies in what he describes as a near-
idealistic end state. Its limitlessness prevents full-scale success when trying to accomplish an 
overwhelming number of tasks (Rotmann, 2016, pp. 4, 5). From this perspective, Call and 
Cousens’ description of peacebuilding shares many commonalities with the broad ‘whole-of-
government’ application of stabilization presented by Rotmann. For Rotmann, the counter to 
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this broad approach however, is the narrow application of stabilization in the form of 
‘stabilization-as-crisis-management’. 
          Stabilization-as-crisis-management, Rotmann’s second version of stabilization, one 
that has been adopted by key members of the international community (Belloni & Moro, 
2019, pg. 447) is meant to describe a more limited attempt to accomplish a large list of 
constructive and idealized goals. This is as Rotmann argues, more about defusing crises and 
creating “resilience to political shock” than complete institutional reconstruction (Rotmann, 
2016, pg. 5). Essentially, the end goal with this narrower approach is to provide the state in 
need with the basic tools such as a legitimate justice system, an effective military and police, 
as well as basic tools for bilateral diplomacy (Rotmann, 2016, pp. 5-6). These tools are not 
designed to directly remove a country from its fragile state but are to give the state the ability 
to stabilize a situation by preventing emergencies of political volatility and violence 
(Rotmann, 2016, pg. 6). The pursuit of a more shock resistant state where the national or 
international security forces can react to and withstand emergencies are line with Robert 
Muggah’s presentation of the reality that with this narrow, more recent approach, the 
humanitarian element to stabilisation is often excluded to make room for security institutions 
to end and prevent conflict (Muggah, 2010, pg. 47). Rotmann posits that this narrow 
approach is the more realistic and beneficial model for stabilization in that it avoids biting off 
more than intervening states can chew and leading to what he refers to as ‘intervention 
fatigue’. Intervention fatigue is meant to describe how foreign states and their security forces 
can overextend themselves and become bogged down in the continuation of military and 
peace operations as was experienced by American and coalition forces in their drawn out 
conflicts in the middle east in the 2000s (Bolloni & Moro, 2019, pg. 452 and Rotmann, 2016, 
pg. 11, as quoted in O’Toole, 2014).  
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          Rotmann argues that where the broad and narrow approaches to stabilization 
intertwine is in overstating or overvaluing the knowledge and power of the donor or what he 
refers to as the ‘international stabilizer’ (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 6). With this overvaluing, 
Rotmann argues, the local actors on either side of the conflict who often appear to hold the 
real power in conflict scenarios and thereby have the ability to dictate success do not often 
have a seat at the table (Rotmann, 2016, p. 6). This insensitivity toward local inclusion and 
knowledge leads often to even increased levels of destabilization and fragility. Rotmann cites 
an example of holding democratic elections in areas where the intensity of political elections 
or military presence has led to economic and social instability in some regions unaccustomed 
to these practices (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 6). Every relationship between local actors and 
‘international stabilizers’ can vary and therefore there remains no prescriptive guide on how 
to manage these relationships, though there remains consensus among scholars who 
investigate stabilization that the relationship and incorporation of local actors must be valued 
and maintained (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 7, Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 26, & Siegle, 2011, pg. 27). 
        According to Rotmann, the importance of including local actors in stabilization 
efforts, regardless of the approach, stems from the fact that these actors often include the 
people that stabilization will affect the most (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 7) Traditionally excluded 
from discussion, the local actor is an important facet to Rotmann’s conceptualization of 
stabilization. Quoting his previously published co-authored work with Steinacker, Rotmann 
concludes by stating that a salvaged definition of stabilization could be summarized as 
follows: 
“A possible, still ambitious way to frame [stabilization] may be as an ‘intervention in 
an acute crisis to support local partners in restoring a legitimate and effective political 
16 
 
order as part of the long-term promotion of peace and development’”. (Rotmann, 
2016, pg. 12). 
             How Rotmann arrived at this conclusion can serve as a guide to the further 
examination of stabilization-as-crisis-management. In Rotmann and Steinacker’s 2013 policy 
submission to the German Government, they reviewed four countries and how they 
conceptualized three terms in order to establish a baseline to gauge Germany’s potential 
stabilization direction. The United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and the Netherlands 
were the states studied.  Fragility, stability and stabilization were the concepts examined. 
Rotmann and Steinacker mention that ‘fragility’ is the problem, ‘stability’ is the solution and 
‘stabilization’ is the path to get there (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 36). How each of 
these states make use of these concepts showcases how they arrived at their contemporary 
stabilization doctrine, which in turn allows Rotmann to describe his route for settling on a 
definition of stabilization that is ‘stabilization-as-crisis-management.  
               Rotmann and Steinacker present their findings beginning with the United Kingdom. 
They remark that with its policy Building Stability Overseas Strategy, adopted in 2011, the 
UK sought to promote a doctrine centred on quick reaction to political shock as well as more 
institutional expansion to aim for long-term peace and security (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, 
pg. 11). This British version of stability required the increasing capacity of political systems 
so that these systems could become legitimate and representative while upholding the rule of 
law, which is considered central to managing conflict effectively (Rotmann & Steinacker, 
2013, pg. 36). This approach, though attempting to employ both a wide structural scope with 
narrow expectations of building resiliency to political shock, is seen as too ‘utopian’ for 
Rotmann and Steinacker (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 15). This relates similarly to the 
American approach in that for the US, institutional capacity remains key, however, the 
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military and security actors with the United States model hold the reins unlike the civilian-led 
approach of the UK. Where the US splits again from the UK is their fragmented 
organizational structure for conducting stabilization operations for which Rotmann and 
Steinacker remark often falls to regional leaders.  Due to the US reliance on military 
organization, operational responsibility falls on regional military commanders, a 
characteristic unsuitable for Germany (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 28 and Gilder, 2019, 
pg. 51).  
        For the Netherlands and Canada however, Rotmann and Steinacker see their ‘modest’ 
approach to stability more appealing (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 36). The 
understanding that the ability to withstand shock should occur first before structural or 
institutional development as a sort of ‘prerequisite’ is essential to stability for both (Rotmann 
& Steinacker, 2013, pg. 36). The Dutch, however, are critiqued as their definition of 
operations fitting the stabilization mould are quite broad. Their activities can range from 
basic services to more extensive peace operations (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 34). For 
Canada, understanding stability as a short-term goal as it pertains to crisis management is 
key. It is presented by Rotmann and Steinacker that Canada is the only of the four countries 
examined that recognized that the international actors should play a support-only role with 
primary responsibility resting with the host country (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 21). It 
is this more modest application that they favour. The narrowed crisis management model is 
the more appropriate conception of stabilization as they settle on a definition that “refers to 
intervention in an acute crisis to support local partners in restoring legitimate and effective 
political order as part of the long-term promotion of peace and development” (Rotmann & 
Steinacker, 2013, pg. 38).  
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             For them, stabilization must be preventative and reactive. It does not require whole-
of-government approaches to completely rebuild institutions within a fragile state however it 
must ensure these states can be supported in restoring order to eventually promote long-
lasting peace and development (Rotmann & Steinacker, 2013, pg. 38). Their road to 
stabilization-as-crisis-management showcases the direction that key world powers have taken 
to promote a form of stabilization that emphasizes shock resilience and managing crises. In 
recent years, states that often engage in ‘stabilization’ have moved to define the term itself 
with a more robust focus. With this, previous ‘whole-of-government’ models engaged with 
broad strokes of development have been sidelined. Consensus among many developed states 
who are taking part in these international involvement missions are focusing on handling 
violence and unrest from spoiler groups (Belloni & Moro, 2019, pg. 447). Their recognition 
of the complexity and broad application of peacebuilding has driven them to a more narrowed 
application of the concept (Belloni & Moro, 2019, pg. 452). 
        A Critique of ‘stabilization-as-crisis-management’ 
        Although Rotmann makes the split between stabilization-as-peacebuilding and 
stabilization-as-crisis-management, it is the narrower form of stabilization that is argued to be 
the more practical and feasible form. However, even in this limited version, stabilization 
efforts led by international actors are not exempt from critique.  
          Roger Mac Ginty pursues a counter to this form of stabilization arguing that it has lost 
its way as a means of achieving peace. In pursuing stabilization, international actors have 
prioritized their own political interests over those of the state in need (Mac Ginty, 2012). Mac 
Ginty critiques stabilization-as-crisis-management by remarking that the core elements of 
stabilization-as-peacebuilding outlined by Rotmann including the all-encompassing 
institutional reformation are side-lined to make room for securitization and a focus on 
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military action to quell instability (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 24). Much of Mac Ginty’s concern 
with contemporary stabilization comes from the narrower form it has taken in recent years. 
Contrary to  Rotmann who sees in this narrower form a more focused and prioritized 
approach to stabilization which has broken away from the all-encompassing stabilization-as-
peacebuilding, Mac Ginty sees contemporary stabilization as a watered down, less 
enthusiastic approach to counter state fragility where international actors lose interest in and 
are content with limited results. 
          Mac Ginty posits that states in recent years have come to the realization that lasting 
peace is complex with unpredictable outcomes. With this, international actors have become 
much less optimistic with the success of their missions aimed at bringing an end to conflict 
(Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 21). Even with peace-support and governance interventions occurring 
at substantial rates, intervenors are continuing to observe a lack of progress in many of their 
areas of operations (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 21). Citing examples such as Rwanda, South 
Sudan, Iraq and notably for this essay, in Afghanistan, Mac Ginty remarks that even with 
many years of continued foreign aid and international effort poured into these countries, they 
are still marked by Freedom House as “not free” even in 2012 (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 21). His 
point with this is that despite the overwhelming expenditure of resources, both financial and 
militarily, success in the pursuit of peace in some of these hotspots has been “patchy at best” 
(Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 21). 
             Mac Ginty critiques this newer form of stabilization as he indicates that states have 
started taking a ‘good enough’ approach (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 21). States are guilty as Mac 
Ginty remarks of providing a watered-down version of stabilization as opposed to a narrowed 
one. Mac Ginty refers to this as ‘liberal internationalism-lite’ or a ‘stripped-down budget 
version of intervention’ (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 22). Mac Ginty’s main critique is that peace 
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itself has been side-lined to make room for counterterrorism efforts and combat action post 
9/11, showing a stark shift from the peace efforts of the 1990s which are seen as aspiring to 
more optimistic agendas (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 22). 
            The above critiques from Mac Ginty centre on international intervention and its 
contemporary focus. However, Mac Ginty remarks that a number of previous definitions have 
also shown their complexity in defining stabilization itself (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 24). 
Although comforting that the term ‘peace’ is indeed present throughout many official 
definitions of stabilization by governments and other international bodies, Mac Ginty 
describes contemporary explanations of the term as a ‘hodge-podge’ of words transferable to 
definitions of peacebuilding, security, and development (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 24). He argues 
that stabilization, as described by Rotmann, is a new ‘catch-phrase’ that needs to be examined 
within the realm of ‘securitization’ as it relates to aid and peace-support (Mac Ginty, 2012, 
pg. 24). By securitization, Mac Ginty refers to the prioritization of security and the security 
lens especially in areas such as humanitarian aid and development (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 24). 
The increased presence of securitization in conceptualizing stabilization makes the role of the 
military more prominent in stabilization missions, for Mac Ginty, this is problematic as he 
describes the main role of the military is ‘to fight’ making their presence a potential 
hindrance towards peace itself (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 27). 
       As Mac Ginty indicates clearly both in his introduction and conclusion, he is not 
against the practice of stability. However he believes the reality of contemporary stabilization 
has backed away too far from the elements that would make up Rotmann’s stabilization-as-
peacebuilding and pushed more into a narrow direction centring on minimal standards of 
progress and emphasizing securitization with a reduced focus on peace, humanitarian aid and 
development (Mac Ginty, 2012, pp. 26-28). As definitions of stabilization continue to be 
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vague, Mac Ginty points out a need to hone in on a definition that practices what it preaches 
such as consistent usages of the term ‘peace’ to ensure the international community stays on 
course and does not forget reasons for its involvement in the first place (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 
27). He remarks that the role of the security forces has taken over, and with that, the peace 
element needs to regain focus (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 28). As Mac Ginty remarks, success has 
not been a signature feature of contemporary stabilization missions (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 
21). However, a closer examination of whether or not ‘stabilization’ as a central focus of 
international involvement is to be dismissed out of hand will follow below.  
Stabilization Moving Forward 
           Rotmann unpacked the concept of stabilization firstly with the broad form of 
peacebuilding followed by its narrower contemporary form with crisis management and 
resistance to political shock as key priorities. As Rotmann and other scholars indicate, the 
original conception of stabilization, which mirrored to some extent the conceptual breath of 
peacebuilding adopted an all-encompassing approach to removing a fragile country from its 
state of instability. This wide-reaching action of stabilization is criticized by Rotmann as 
taking on more than international stabilizers can handle. This is consistent with Call and 
Cousens’ analysis of the ‘no-agency-left-behind’ notion of peacebuilding which saw large 
‘laundry lists’ of goals and strategies making the pursuit of a narrow, achievable endstate 
more difficult (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg 3). With this, peacebuilding in its standalone form 
as well as the all-encompassing stabilization-as-peacebuilding approach are too broad to be 
practical models for stabilization. 
        What remains then is stabilization-as-crisis-management as the dominant approach. The 
more tapered lens makes it more practical for contemporary international involvement. 
Rotmann’s exploration of four NATO members; namely Canada, the Netherlands, the United 
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Kingdom and the United States, showcased the direction each of these states took to move 
towards a more narrow application of stabilization. Rotmann gives the example of the US 
State Department which until 2015 maintained a “soaring picture of building sustainable 
peace” with an all-encompassing approach to increase state capacity and further develop state 
institutions (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 5). In 2015 the US shifted gears with resistance to political 
shock being the primary concern in developing the capacity of domestic institutions to be 
more resilient and flexible (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 5). As Rotmann remarks, this new direction 
was common-place for the other states he examined with the exception of the Netherlands 
(Rotmann, 2016, pg. 6). This essay is in agreement with the direction taken in recent years by 
the international community to pursue a more robust, narrow approach to stabilization. Those 
who have adopted this approach share a focus on countering spoilers by increasing shock 
resistance for legitimate authority (Gilder, 2019, pg. 51). This in turn, though more a 
common occurrence within the past decade than prior, provides an effective lens to measure 
success when examining future stabilization missions as well as those of the past.  
Concluding Stabilization 
         As has been shown, the concept of stabilization, along with terms like peacebuilding 
can take numerous forms and have a wide range of interpretations. With both, there exists no 
universally accepted term to fully understand everything they encompass. Beginning with 
Call and Cousens, understanding peacebuilding was integral to developing an understanding 
of the context in which ‘stabilization’ emerged as a manner of framing certain international 
missions in conflict and post-conflict environments. As an all-encompassing approach, the 
institutionalization of peace was a critical component to peacebuilding. It was also central to 
the varying measurements of success that could be used to evaluate the success of 
peacebuilding efforts (Call & Cousens, 2008). Also critical was a focus on measures to 
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rebuild the state, or statebuilding which emphasized the institutional development and 
capacity building of the state (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9, 10). This facet involving state 
capacity was present throughout Rotmann’s expansion of stabilization-as-peacebuilding and 
its all-encompassing approach to stabilization (Rotmann, 2016, pp. 4, 5). Rotmann among 
others however, prefers the conceptualization of stabilization taking the form of stabilization-
as-crisis-management. With this approach, the scope of stabilization missions contracted in 
order to focus on key elements such as increasing the shock resilience of the state which is to 
be offered assistance (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 6). Mac Ginty however, criticizes this new form of 
stabilization, stating it focuses too much on the securitization of the state with notions of 
peace put in the back seat (Mac Ginty, 2012). As stabilization missions have and will 
continue to take a number of different forms, universal consensus of what stabilization is 
precisely will be unlikely. However, the lens of stabilization can used to further evaluate past 
international involvement missions with the goal of assessing what form they have taken and 
in what way they may have failed. As it pertains to Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, Canada 
underwent nearly 13 years of armed conflict in an attempt to stabilize parts of a fragile 
country. Where the Canadian Government and its allies succeeded and failed will be 
presented in the next section of this essay. 
Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan: A Chronology 
Operation Apollo 2001- 2002 
         The story of Canada’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan begins on September 
11th, 2001 with the attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. The following day, 
the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 condemning the 
attacks and calling for states to work together to counter acts of terrorism and foster 
international peace and security (United Nations, 2001). In concert with the Security Council 
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on September 12th, NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson invoked NATO 
Article 5 of the Alliance’s charter indicating that an attack on one member would be 
considered an attack on all (Boucher & Nossal, 2017, pg. 15).2 Twenty five days later on 
October 7th, 2001, coalition forces led by the United States would enter Afghanistan under 
the operational name, Operation Enduring Freedom (Government of Canada, 2014). Canada 
would begin an almost thirteen-year engagement initially ousting the Taliban, followed by 
providing security assistance, governing guidance and development aid to the Afghan 
government first in the country’s capital, Kabul, followed by Canada’s leadership role in 
Kandahar Province. In March of 2014, the last CAF members would leave Afghanistan 
bringing their third and final phase in the country to an end and concluding Canada’s chapter 
in Afghanistan.  
          On October 7th, 2001 at the time when American air and ground forces began 
operations in Afghanistan, Canada officially pledged its support and commitment to the 
United States and promised air, naval and ground forces of its own to the mission 
(Government of Canada, 2014). Two days later, Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) 
Halifax would depart its NATO fleet tasking and sail for the Arabian Sea (Government of 
Canada, 2014). Over the coming months to finish off the year, HMCS Charlottetown, 
Vancouver, Preserver and Iroquois would join HMCS Halifax in the Arabian Sea (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017, pg. 16). Transport and surveillance aircraft would also deploy to the region and 
by the end of 2001 so would 40 members of one of Canada’s special forces units, Joint Task 
Force 2 (JTF2) (Saideman, 2017, pg. 132). The presence of the latter, however, was not being 
publicly acknowledged at the time (Boucher & Nossal, 2016, pg. 16). This acknowledgement 
 
2 Canada’s on-the-ground mission in Afghanistan is examined at close range in Jean-
Christophe Boucher et Kim Richard Nossal’s book, The Politics of War (2017). Their 
chapter, The Away Game (pp. 15-43) offers insight into Canada’s increasingly challenging 
roles on the ground in Afghanistan from 2001-2014. 
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would not come until the early months of 2002 before the bulk of Canada’s pledged 
commitment would arrive in Afghanistan. 
           With the exception of the five aforementioned ships, a few support aircraft and the 
JTF2 members operating on the ground, the beginning of Canada’s expansive commitment 
wouldn’t begin until early 2002. In February 2002, Canada’s battlegroup deployed with an 
infantry battalion and an armoured reconnaissance element along with the pertinent support 
assets to complement the combat units (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 16). This battlegroup 
would operate within a Brigade Combat Team under the American 101st Airborne Division 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 16). 
      This first stage of Canada’s Afghan mission took the name of Operation Apollo 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 16). Throughout Operation Apollo, the Canadian Armed 
Forces (CAF) had a handful of primary responsibilities. Principally, the CAF was engaged in 
numerous combat operations to root out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in the country 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 17). In addition to combat action, Canada was responsible for 
the security and defence of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) in Southern Afghanistan which the 
coalition used as a staging facility for many of its offensive operations (Boucher & Nassal, 
2017, pg. 17). Humanitarian aid played a minor role for CAF personnel on the ground in the 
early days. However, as the dust began to settle with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda shrinking 
considerably in size and strength, the question of what Afghanistan was going to look like in 
the absence of the insurgent groups began to gain traction (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 17).  
The Taliban government and their rule over Afghanistan collapsed in December of 2001 and 
the details of their replacement began to unfold (Ibrahami, 2017, pg. 956). 
        In December of 2001, Hamid Karzai was appointed as an interim leader of 
Afghanistan, however six months later, it was expected that a new interim government would 
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be chosen by a Loya Jirga (Government of Canada, 2014). The Loya Jirga was a form of 
council whose membership varied with Afghan males from all over Afghanistan drawn from 
different tribes, communities and backgrounds (Government of Canada, 2014). In June of 
2002, this Loya Jirga selected Karzai as President until free and fair elections could be held in 
the country (Government of Canada, 2014). Karzai’s role as head of state was guided heavily 
by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which was established in December of 
2001 with UNSC resolution 1386 (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 18). With a ‘stabilization’ 
objective in mind, ISAF developed its reach expansively and in 2003 Canada would take 
command of the assistance force in its move to Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017 pp. 18, 19). This would be the beginning of the second stage of Canada’s 
involvement in the conflict under the operational name Operation Athena (Boucher & Nassal, 
pg. 18).  
Operation Athena 2002-2005 
          The CAF and members of the Federal Government deployed en-masse in July of 2003 
in Kabul to begin working in the capital city and building up elements of the Afghan 
Government (Boucher & Nassal, pg. 18). Similar to Operation Apollo, a reinforced 
battlegroup was deployed to Kabul along with an integrated team of military and civilian 
personnel titled the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, pp. 18, 19). 
This team’s mission was to support the government of Afghanistan in the formulation of 
policies, management and developing other national strategies to aid in its development 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 19). The CAF would also take on a new role with some of its 
members engaged in the training of troops of the Afghan National Army (ANA). This along 
with the other initiatives were aimed at transitioning Afghanistan to be more autonomous and 
self-sufficient (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 19). The second phase of the mission in Kabul 
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would last until 2006 when Canada agreed to take over Regional Command South (RC 
South) temporarily while also agreeing to take a leadership role in the management and 
development of Kandahar Province (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 20, 21). 
Operation Athena (II) 2006-2011 
           During the period of 2003 to 2006 there were several political shifts both in Ottawa 
and Kabul involving Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. Canada’s independent leadership of 
ISAF ended with NATO taking full responsibility of the force as well as efforts in 
Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 20 and Murray & McCoy, 2010, pg. 178). Back 
home however, Prime Minister (PM) Jean Chrétien under whose leadership Canada became 
involved in Afghanistan in the first place (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 16), was succeeded 
as head of government by Paul Martin (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 20). Prior to the 
turnover, PM Chrétien committed Canada to providing a Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) somewhere in Afghanistan as part of NATO’s goal of having complete outreach for 
stabilization in Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 20). PM Martin inherited this 
decision and was quite critical and unenthusiastic about Canada’s role in the mission 
(Boucher & Nassal, pg. 20). PM Martin himself wanted Canada out of Afghanistan and had 
hoped to solidify Canada’s commitment to only one additional year at the beginning of his 
premiership, however due to increased pressure from NATO Allies and Chief of Defence 
Staff, General Rick Hillier, PM Martin agreed for Canada to take responsibility for Regional 
Command South (RC South) which included the Afghan provinces of Nimruz, Helmand, 
Zabul, Oruzgan, Day Kundi and notably Kandahar (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 20, 21). In 
addition to the temporary command of RC South, Canada’s primary role in Afghanistan was 
to manage and administer the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017, pg. 21). 
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        The PRTs were part of the American plan to stabilize and build Afghanistan. They 
were established in 25 of Afghanistan’s 34 Provinces (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 21). The 
Canadian application of this plan in Kandahar was to take the form of the “3-Ds”; defence, 
diplomacy and development (Tremblay & Pahlavi, 2013, pg. 70 and Boucher & Nassal, 2017, 
pg. 21). This “3-D” approach was referred to alternatively and more commonly as the 
“whole-of-government” approach and was designed to incorporate various government 
departments and agencies to complement the CAF in Kandahar Province (Boucher & Nassal, 
2017, pg. 21 and Tremblay & Pahlavi, 2013, pg. 69). These agencies included the Treasury 
Board, Corrections Canada, Canadian Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 21). The big move began in August of 
2005 and the CAF was able to begin combat operations out of their new home at KAF in 
early 2006 (Boucher & Nassal, pg. 22). Government agencies began working with their 
Kandahar counterparts and the training of military and police forces continued within the 
province (Boucher & Nasal, pg. 22).  
           With Canada’s premier role in Kandahar taking on this ‘whole-of-government’ effort, 
increased presence and resources from the CAF would be needed to provide security and 
support to these agencies and individuals working within the province as fighting would 
intensify in the early months of their deployment there (Boucher & Nassal. 2017, pg. 23). 
The CAF began this new up-scaled part of their mission, codenamed Operation Athena 
(Phase II) (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 23). In keeping with the effort to stabilize and 
develop Kandahar Province, the CAF and other elements of the KPRT could not operate 
exclusively from KAF. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) had to be established to have more 
outreach to the communities that were not adjacent to Kandahar City or the airfield (Boucher 
& Nassal, 2017. pg. 23). Some of these FOBs had been over 100 kilometres from the 
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Canadian stronghold at KAF (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 23). The first of the military’s 
supply and outreach challenges would become present in these opening moves in Kandahar 
Province. 
          Canada had gone to Afghanistan without large helicopters as they had sold all of their 
CH-147 Chinooks to the Netherlands the decade prior (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 23). As 
the CAF hoped to provide their assistance to the varying areas around the province through 
the presence of their FOBs, they needed to be able to supply and remain connected with them 
from KAF. As Canada did not have the means for large scale aerial transport and supply to 
these forward positions, much of this support had to come by road which left them more 
vulnerable to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or ambush (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 
23). With exceptionally risky travel, a ramped up ‘fighting season’ from the Taliban and 
consistent offensive operations targeting the Taliban insurgency, the CAF would struggle in 
2006 as between January and October, 36 CAF members would be killed (Boucher & Nassal, 
2016, pg. 23). 
     Near the beginning of this cycle in February of 2006, Conservative Party Leader 
Stephen Harper would defeat PM Paul Martin electorally to be the new Prime Minister and in 
turn, inherit the mission in Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 23). As opposition 
leader, PM Harper consistently supported Canada’s involvement in stark contrast to PM 
Martin who as Stephen Saideman remarks “quickly ran away from the mission” (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017, pg. 23 and Saideman, 2017, pg. 136). PM Harper dismantled PM Martin’s 
pledge to leave Afghanistan in 2007 stating that Canada would remain in Afghanistan “for 
the long haul” (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 24). Harper moved quickly to address some of 
the core problems the CAF was experiencing in terms of equipment. Purchasing tanks and 
other necessary equipment as Boucher and Nassal cite from J.L. Granatstein “After 2006, 
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there was nothing that the troops needed that wasn’t provided” (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 
24). For example, in 2003, the Canadian Government had been examining replacing its fleet 
of Main Battle Tanks and was only able to send 16 to Afghanistan by 2006 (Spearin, 2014, 
pg. 528). However, in April of 2007, Canada was able to procure over 100 Leopard 2A6 
Main Battle Tanks from Germany and the Netherlands (Spearin, 2014, pg. 528). This did not 
fix all of the problems. Even with a supportive Prime Minister and upgraded and more 
numerous equipment, the CAF continued to face challenges in Kandahar when engaged in 
combating the Taliban. The Canadian battlegroup numbered only a few thousand soldiers, 
many of whom were supporting troops with only around 1000 soldiers whose role was to go 
‘outside the wire’ and fight (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 24). Kandahar is one of 
Afghanistan’s largest provinces and with this, Canada’s small battlegroup and their allies also 
operating within the province were not able to appropriately deal with the Taliban insurgency 
threat on a scale sufficient to its requirement (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 23). The CAF 
found often that they would conduct effective combat operations in one community or district 
then come to find the Taliban had replanted themselves once the troops had returned to base. 
(Marten, 2010, pg. 229). This problem was not isolated to Kandahar. The ISAF mission as a 
whole was experiencing troop shortages as they pertained to the larger mission at hand 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 25 & Marten, 2010, pg. 229). 
          Even with the troops appearing to see a partial increase in equipment and support 
from Ottawa, support for the mission itself began to deteriorate as there lacked tangible 
success stories and progress to be presented to the public about Canada’s engagement in 
Kandahar Province (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 25).  Additionally, the Harper government 
sought recommendations on what the future would hold for Canada in Kandahar after 2009. 
In October of 2007, PM Harper set up the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in 
Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 25). Chaired by former Liberal Deputy Prime 
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Minister, John Manley, the ‘Manley Report’ was to work independently to analyse Canada’s 
current mission in Afghanistan and provide recommendations for the coming years while also 
displaying bipartisanship between the Liberal and Conservative Parties (Marten, 2010, pg. 
226).  
            The panel conducted their research over a number of months engaging with domestic 
scholars, diplomats, Members of Parliament, bureaucrats, foreign equivalents from the UK, 
US and NATO, Canadian and coalition military personnel, Afghan government officials, 
military commanders, local citizens and members of Afghanistan’s civil society (Manley et 
al., 2008, pg. 9). The results compiled allowed the panel to assess the first six years of 
Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan and attempt to identify some of the core issues and 
provide a series of recommendations to the Harper Government in the years going forward 
(Manley et al., 2008). The report identified the key objective for Canada and its partners as 
contributing “to a better governed, stable and developing Afghanistan whose government can 
protect the security of the country and its people” (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 33). Throughout 
the report, consistent issues were highlighted across the board ranging from the 
aforementioned troop count discrepancies and helicopter deficiencies as well as 
organizational troubles both in Kandahar and in Ottawa. 
          The report also describes the reality and precariousness of Afghanistan’s situation. 
Citing Afghanistan’s 2007 placement on the UN’s Human Development Index as 174th of 
178 States, they mark the situation for many Afghans as “grim” (Manley et al., 2008, pp. 10, 
18). With this, the report references three areas of importance integral to Canada’s and the 
coalition’s mission as a whole in Afghanistan and specifically Kandahar Province. Firstly, 
security and the development of Afghanistan’s ability to provide security to their own people 
is emphasized. Secondly, governance and the ability for Afghan institutions to provide 
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services to their population is highlighted. Lastly, the report mentions the role that 
development had to play in improving the quality of life of the Afghan people (Manley et al., 
2008, pg. 11).  
       Beginning with security, a primary challenge identified for ISAF within Kandahar 
Province which posed a particular problem for Canada once it took the lead in this area was 
the insufficient number of coalition troops and insufficiency in the capacity available from 
the ANA (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 14). Firstly, with the troop count, the report called on a 
need for increased troop surges from coalition allies to increase troop numbers in Kandahar 
Province and for states to have less reservations about troop activities such as fighting at 
night or aerial combat (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 14). The US, UK and Canada have as the 
report states “borne more than a proportionate share of war-fighting in Afghanistan (Manley 
et al., 2008, pg. 14). In addition to this, the report called on an improvement and increase in 
the training and capacity of the ANA with an end-goal of having them be capable of 
providing their own security without assistance from those three key players as well as the 
rest of ISAF (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 14). 
      For governance, Afghanistan at this stage in 2007 had an elected Parliament and 
President, institutionally however, the report highlights an exceptionally weak status existing 
among Afghanistan’s government institutions (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 16). As a transitional 
government, the Afghan Government as the report states lacked experience and knowledge 
on how to actually govern a state (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 16). Additionally, there existed 
high levels of corruption within state institutions and employees from bureaucrats to judges 
to police officers who are generally underpaid and poorly trained (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 
16). This is highlighted as a key deficiency in Afghanistan progression with government 
institutions lagging behind in improvement and is indicated by the report as one of the “most 
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valuable and urgent contributions that Canadians and others can make to the well-being of 
Afghans and their families” (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 17).  
          The report’s third highlighted area of action centred around development. At the time 
of the report’s release, 6.6 million Afghan’s did not meet minimum food standards, gender 
inequality continued to be rampant throughout Afghanistan and illiteracy rates sat 
increasingly high with 57 percent for males and 87 percent for women (Manley et al., 2008, 
pg.18). Economically, Afghanistan still remained exceptionally poor however in terms of its 
resources, it had untapped resources that should they be given the right tools, Afghan’s 
economy could see stark improvement (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 18). This includes 
appropriate infrastructure and knowledge base to maximize economic potential. Additionally, 
the report highlighted as it does throughout, the importance of measurable goals and a more 
efficient planning route to identify progress and development (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 19). 
       The three sectors, security, governance and development highlighted by the report 
were seen as interconnected in the general improvement of Afghanistan and each one was 
understood to have the potential to positively impact the other (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 11). 
The report itself said this about interconnectivity: 
“Each dimension of course, affects the others in dynamic interaction. Security enables 
development; effective governance enhances security; development creates 
opportunities, and multiplies the rewards of improved security and good governance” 
(Manley et al., 2008, pg. 11). 
These three symbiotic facets of improvement for Afghanistan (i.e., to pursue a more self-
sufficient way of security, governance and development) showcased key concerns for the 
Canadian mission. The panel’s mandate, however, was to provide recommendations on what 
Canada’s future role and actions should be within Afghanistan while identifying key issues 
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pertaining to the mission. The evaluation of the mission up until 2007 marks certain 
progressions made by the CAF and the Federal Government agencies working in Afghanistan 
such as improved infrastructure, education development and supporting local government 
structures (Manley et al., pg. 25). However, many of the issues highlighted previously 
continued to stall progress. In response, the panel provided, five key recommendations based 
on their observations. 
        The first on the list of recommendations was for a push to begin the systematic 
organization of clear and comprehensive strategies for not only Canada but for the alliance 
collectively and to include all relevant bodies in these plans (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 34).  
Communication was highlighted as a problem between working bodies and inclusion of 
Afghan authorities was identified as a key element for further efforts. Additionally, the first 
recommendation called for more involvement from the Prime Minister and cabinet to allow 
for increased oversight (Manley et al., 2008., pg. 34). 
           Secondly, the report heavily underscored troop shortages and security deficiencies 
both within the alliance and the Afghan security sector. It called for an expansion to the 
Canadian-led battlegroup in Kandahar as well as even specifically noting the request for 
medium-lift helicopters to replace the aforementioned CH-147s sold to the Dutch in the 
1990s (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 35 & Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 23). The report even went 
as far as to mention threatening the withdrawal of the CAF in its combat role in Afghanistan 
if the Federal Government refused to acquire medium-lift helicopters for the military (Manley 
et al., 2008, pg. 35). Additionally, as the report highlighted, increased coalition troop 
numbers would allow for the battlegroup to begin transitioning out of Kandahar sooner as the 
training level and capacity of the ANA would increase faster with more coalition troops 
present to support these domestic security forces (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 35). 
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           Thirdly, the report called on the civilian wing of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan to 
develop and create more strategies that would be beneficial and inclusive of all Afghans 
(Manley et al., 2008, pg. 36). They refer to a “signature project” led by Canadians to have a 
more meaningful impact on the Afghan people (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 36). 
            Fourthly, a more systematic and organized manner of tracking progress had to be 
established to allow future planning to be conducted and discussed effectively (Manley et al., 
2008, pg. 36). With this, the Panel called for a review of the effort for security, governance 
and development in the year 2011 (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 36). 
            The last point of the Report centred around communication to Canadians so there was 
clear direction to the public as to where the mission was heading and what Canada’s priorities 
were (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 36. With this, more transparency could be used by the public 
with respect to the Federal Government’s involvement in Afghanistan to allow for more 
discussion and debate surrounding the mission (Manley et al., 2008, pg. 36). 
         It did not take long for PM Harper’s Government to act on a number of the key 
recommendations of the Manley Report. In March of 2008, the mission in Kandahar was 
quickly extended to at least July of 2011 (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 27). 1000 American 
troops would transfer from elsewhere in Afghanistan to Kandahar to help the troop shortage 
and the Federal Government indicated that six CH-147s would be purchased for use in 
Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 28). Three signature projects were announced, 
these being the redevelopment of the Dahla Dam, the construction effort of 50 schools as well 
as medical aid to treat polio in hopes of eradicating it entirely in the province by 2010 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 28). The Federal Government’s reaction to the Manley Report 
did not answer all of its suggestions. Many of the clear aims and goals of the report were 
responded to in hopes of making Canada’s remaining years in Afghanistan more successful 
36 
 
and effective (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 28, 29) in tackling the three pillars of need for 
Afghanistan: security, governance, and development. 
         Even with the recommendations of the Manley Report, Canada’s remaining years in 
Kandahar continued to face numerous challenges. The Taliban were simply getting better 
fighting the coalition and they began taking more territory from the control of Afghanistan 
and ISAF (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 36). Many aid agencies had begun to withdraw as the 
security situation continued to deteriorate (Murray & McCoy, 2010, pg. 183). The Taliban’s 
regeneration continued and support for the coalition began to decline as the end of the decade 
approached (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 38). Attacks seemed to increase and during 2008 
and 2009, 64 Canadian’s were killed in Kandahar Province (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 
38). The election of American President Barack Obama would usher in a surge of troops to 
Afghanistan benefiting Kandahar Province in particular (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 39). 
With this, Canada began their transition phase out of the province to be completed by mid-
2011 hereby ending Operation Athena (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 39, 40). Because of the 
precarious security situation with Canada’s final few years in Kandahar, their established 
signature projects surrounding the Dahla Dam, education development and the eradication of 
polio were seen as incomplete by the time Operation Athena came to a close in 2011 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 40). 
Operation Attention 2011-2014 
         Although Canada’s combat mission with Operation Athena in Kandahar had come to 
an end, the CAF was not to leave Afghanistan until 2014 (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 42). 
For three more years the CAF would work with their ANA partners increasing their security 
capacity in a training mission in Kabul as other NATO allies began to suggest plans for a 
drawdown of forces and eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 
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40, 41). The hope was not to simply abandon Afghanistan as a lost cause as the security 
situation continued to worsen but to hope that the Afghan Government could rapidly reach a 
point of self-sufficiency and be able to handle their security situation on their own without 
the assistance of the ISAF coalition (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 40, 41). During this three-
year period, Canada was to deploy around one thousand troops to train the ANA and continue 
to provide a very reduced humanitarian assistance role supporting youth and human rights 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 41). In March of 2014, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan came 
to an end with a short flag-lowering ceremony in Kabul, the last Canadian troops boarded an 
aircraft and headed back to Canada. 4539 days after PM Chrétien’s initial commitment in 
solidarity with the United States in October of 2001, Canada’s twelve-and-a-half-year 
stabilization mission came to an end (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 41). 
Analysis 
          Canada’s role in Afghanistan as was laid out above, was organized into four sections 
spanning twelve and a half years beginning with Operation Apollo in 2001 and finishing 
Operation Attention in 2014 (Government of Canada, 2014). Dictating the success or the 
failure of a mission would require us to know what the goal of the mission was and what the 
planned outcome would be. For NATO and its allies who participated in the mission in 
varying ways, the end goal was to stabilize one of the poorest and most fragile states in the 
world following the removal of the Taliban Government (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 15 
and Manley et al, 2008, pg. 3). In agreeance with Rotmann, stabilization-as-crisis-
management presents itself as the more appropriate and less idealistic form of stabilization 
which will be used for the overall assessment of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan. However, 
as Canada’s mission took many forms over four different phases, the mission cannot 
immediately be analysed as a whole. The first half of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan 
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resembled Rotmann’s stabilization-as-peacebuilding, however, following the 
recommendations of the independent panel, Canada’s mission began to form closer to 
stabilization-as-crisis-management.                                                                        
          In the opening stages of the mission, Operation Apollo was a military intervention, 
plain and simple. Canada’s mixed battlegroup of infantry, reconnaissance and support units 
were integrated with an American light infantry division whose primary role in the opening 
phase of the Afghan mission was to root out Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017, pp. 16, 17). Although very much a military operation, Operation Apollo in 
concert with the American Operation Enduring Freedom began to lay the groundwork for 
part two of the mission in Afghanistan. 
          Canada’s move to Kabul for Operation Athena in 2002 did not relieve the CAF from a 
combat role. However, it did shift Canada’s priority from a military to a statebuilding one. 
The interim leadership of Hamid Karzai was decided upon in late 2001 before Kabul was 
even on the table for Canada (Government of Canada, 2014 and Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 
18). Canada’s leading role in the Afghan capital was to help this transitional government, 
later locally appointed and eventually elected government of Karzai in the management of the 
new Afghanistan (Boucher & Nassal, pp. 18, 19). While in Kabul, the Canadian Government 
and their Strategic Advisory Team worked closely with the Afghan Government to increase 
their governing capacity (Boucher & Nassal, pg. 19). Additionally, the CAF’s role in Kabul 
was principally to provide security to the city and surrounding region while also working and 
training up their ANA partners to increase their own security reach and capability 
(Tchantouridze, 2013, pg. 337). With the final move of Canada’s forces to Kandahar in 2006, 
these actions of increasing state capacity both in the governance and security sectors were 
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ramped up extensively as Canada took over responsibility for the province and their PRT 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 20). 
         It is here where the Canadian Government pushed further their “3-D” (Defence, 
Diplomacy and Development) approach to the province and as was explained above, the 
“whole-of-government” approach was the common term for this, encompassing many 
Canadian civilian departments to complement the CAF in increasing the capacity of the 
Afghan Government firstly in the capital, Kabul, and later in Kandahar Province (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017, pg. 21). ‘Whole-of-Government’ approaches are integral to Rotmann’s 
application of stabilization-as-peacebuilding and many of Canada’s actions to aid and assist 
the Afghan Government both at the state level initially in Kabul and locally after the move to 
Kandahar outline key features that Rotmann associates with this initial form of stabilization. 
He describes this as the uninterrupted encompassing practice of bringing bureaucrats, military 
personnel and police to increase the capacity of the fragile state which was the goal and the 
approach taken by the Canadians during these two stages (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 5). 
           For stabilization-as-peacebuilding, the Federal Government’s “3-D” approach and its 
relation to ‘whole of government’ as Call and Cousens explain showcase the incorporation of 
many branches of government to build capacity in three areas, diplomacy, development and 
defence (Call & Cousens, 2008, pg. 9). For Kandahar province in particular, this all-
encompassing approach required increased range and outreach which was described by 
Boucher and Nassal as not always a given for the Canadians and the KPRT as the initial 
small number of coalition troops in the province and the limited equipment capacity topped 
off with the range in which the Canadian’s chose to operate with their forward operating 
bases, meant that the Canadian Government and the CAF were spread too thin in their effort 
to reach for everything (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pp. 23-25). This continues to coincide with 
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Rotmann’s critique of stabilization-as-peacebuilding as too idealized and with its 
‘limitlessness’ it is an impractical approach. These limitations explain why Rotmann 
concludes that the crisis management direction has increasingly been taken by a handful of 
Western governments as the more feasible approach to international involvement (Rotmann, 
2016, pp. 4, 5). It would not be until PM Harper chose to act on the Manley Report that many 
of the problem areas such as troop numbers, helicopters or priority focus were identified and 
acted upon (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 25).  
      Because of this, this essay contends that between 2002 and 2008, Canada’s 
‘stabilization’ mission in Afghanistan took the form of stabilization-as-peacebuilding in a 
whole-of-government approach with the aim of heavily increasing the capacity of the Afghan 
Government and their security forces. Until this point however, the Canadian Government 
and CAF were to provide these services to the Afghan people by taking the lead with security 
and infrastructure development. Many of Rotmann’s critiques of stabilization-as-
peacebuilding line up with the Manley Report and its five principal recommendations. For the 
Manley Report, the three principal areas of security, governance and development are 
highlighted as key sectors to be enhanced for the future of Afghanistan (Manley et al., 2008, 
pp. 14-18). However, in their recommendations to the Harper Government on the future of 
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, a less broad lens with stark improvements in the procedural 
planning in these three sectors was forcefully suggested with the report stating that should 
Canada not acquire medium-lift helicopters or should its allies in the region fail to meet their 
responsibilities, they should put forward their notice to withdrawal from Afghanistan 
(Manley et al., 2008, pp. 34-36). 
         One of the Panel’s recommendations addressed needs to fill the security gap and 
move the alliance and in particular, the CAF Battlegroup’s ability to conduct security 
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operations. Addressing troop shortages and equipment deficiencies was key for the Panel and 
making sure that the troops had not only enough numbers to fight the Taliban but also 
adequate motorized, armoured and aerial vehicles to support them was also stressed (Manley 
et al. 2008, pg. 35, Boucher & Nassal, 2016, pp. 24 and Tchantouridze, 2013, pg. 339). 
Though one of Mac Ginty’s critiques of contemporary stabilization centres on a heavy-
handed role of military forces (Mac Ginty, 2012, pg. 24), the change in focus of the Canadian 
government’s approach to its involvement in Afghanistan suggests that government leaders 
may come to side with a more limited ‘stabilization-as-crisis-management’ which in turn 
means that the humanitarian sector may be sidestepped in favour of military action. More 
robust military actions may need to occur to stabilize a situation leaving the development or 
humanitarian areas a bit behind (Muggah, 2010, pg. 47). 
        For Canada, although the security situation in Kandahar Province in the years 
following the implementation of the Manley Report did not improve, the CAF’s attempt at 
remedying it did. By this, Canada actively continued to attempt to make gains against the 
Taliban and lobbied their allies for an increased troop presence in the region with Prime 
Minister Harper doing so at a NATO meeting in April of 2008 (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 
28). President Obama’s implementation of an additional twenty thousand troops to Kandahar 
Province in December, 2009 (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 39) showcased increased shifts to 
keep the security lens at the forefront of the stabilization mission and though the Afghan 
government was not at the point in which they could resist ‘political shock’ (Rotmann, 2016, 
pg. 5), the increasing presence of coalition troops was beginning to make the appearance that 
the coalition could be capable of supporting Afghanistan in this respect more effectively than 
before when troop counts were limited. The Canadian contingent would not surpass the 
3,000-troop mark at any one time and it would not be until the arrival of American troops in 
42 
 
2009 that Kandahar would see an overwhelming increase in troop presence (Saideman, 2017, 
pg. 132-133).  
          The Manley Report had the potential to be viewed as a sort of ‘hail-mary’ (football 
play) for the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government had been approaching 
Afghanistan in a more ‘stabilization-as-peacebuilding’ direction however with the Manley 
Report’s recommendations, a last-ditch attempt to salvage the success of the mission seemed 
possible. The Independent Panel on the Future of Canada’s Role in Afghanistan (2008) 
shifted Canada’s direction in Afghanistan. However, even with a more narrowed, focused and 
prioritized mandate in Kandahar Province until 2011 and Kabul until 2014, many analysts 
maintain that Canada’s stabilization mission had a mixed record. Some contend that Canada’s 
inability to ensure Afghanistan could withstand political shock in the form of Taliban 
aggression led to a lack of success in this narrow approach to bringing stability to the 
country. 
            Canada’s more focused approach did place a heavy value on the security sector by 
addressing troop shortages. With this, the increased security capacity in Kandahar Province, 
it was hoped, would be able to suppress the Taliban threat in order to be able to address the 
three key signature projects. However, this would prove futile. The Dahla Dam project under 
Canadian leadership experienced a number of problems in the height of Harper’s praise for 
the project (Boucher & Nassal, 2017. Pg 36). Continued fighting and a continuation of 
unsuccessful combat operations for the coalition led to a Taliban resurgence in the 
Arghandab District of Kandahar Province in which the dam was located (Boucher & Nassal, 
2017, pg. 36) turning an area with a major development project into a battleground. Work on 
the dam remained unfinished by the time of Canada’s withdrawal (Boucher & Nassa, 2017, 
pg. 40). At the time, it was not expected to be completed until 2017 and was failing to 
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provide water to at least 30% of the canals on the stretch of area it covers (Breede, 2014, pg. 
492). Additionally, when after American forces took over the project in 2011, progress on its 
reconstruction has stalled to an insufficient state of operation (Fisher, 2020).  
         In a similar fashion, the aspirational goal of improving the educational sector within 
Kandahar Province was met with limited success. By 2010, 30 of the 50 planned schools 
were constructed or completed within the province (Breede, 2014, pg. 492). It was estimated 
as well that at that time, only half of children in Kandahar Province went to school (Breede, 
2014, pg. 492). However, as education remains a challenging political and increasingly 
gendered issue within the country, schools have become targets from more conservative 
groups (Tchantouridze, 2013, pg. 342). The Taliban in particular are common perpetrators of 
school bombings and shootings targeting teachers and sometimes children (Tchantouridze, 
2013, pg. 343). As highlighted in the Manley Report, education is a critical element to 
Afghanistan’s development and with low literacy rates even more so amongst girls (Manley 
et al., 2008, pg. 18), this was a facet the CAF really needed to get right. However, like the 
Dahla Dam, when they withdrew from Kandahar Province, this signature project remained 
unfinished (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 40). 
          Canada’s third signature project, polio eradication, was met with similar results. Polio 
was a large problem in Afghanistan. However, Canada’s mission in the country also included 
a public health component which led to the eventual vaccination of over 400,000 Afghans in 
Kandahar Province alone by 2012 (Tchantouridze, 2013, pg. 343). This was a sizable 
accomplishment. However, with a province whose population surpasses over one million 
Afghans, Canada’s third signature project would be incomplete by the end of its mission 
(Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 40). With this incompletion of the three signature projects, 
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan did not end on a positive note. Although the Canadian 
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Government and its military were able to accomplish a number of positive things to generally 
improve the lives of many Afghans, the end result of their signature projects presented their 
war in Afghanistan as one of exhaustion and defeat. A key attribution of the failure in this 
area is that the CAF was unable to get a grasp on the security situation to effectively 
complete the projects. The American troop surge of 20,000 would be too late and insufficient 
to control the Taliban insurgency in Kandahar (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 39).  
Final Assessment 
    Evaluating Canada’s mission in Afghanistan through a stabilization lens took many 
forms. Initially with Canada’s engagement in Kabul and the first half of their mission in 
Kandahar from 2006, the stabilization mission was one of peacebuilding. Canada outright 
attempted an all-encompassing whole-of-government approach to a massive hotspot and 
quickly became overwhelmed and under-resourced for such an undertaking. With the 
Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (2008), the challenges were 
addressed with key areas being marked such as CAF equipment capacity, alliance priorities, 
and government transparency. With this, PM Harper’s Conservative Government made a 
number of adaptations to switch Canada’s stabilization-as-peacebuilding mission to a 
narrower one (Boucher & Nassa, 2017, pg. 24) resembling Rotmann’sstabilization-as-crisis- 
management (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 6). This allowed for a more honed in, narrow application to 
the mission with increased cognition of the security situation, but with an additional focus on 
three signature development projects. These projects though funded and pursued intensely 
experienced a number of problems that would result in their incompletion by the time the 
Canadian effort would come to a close in 2014 (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 40). 
      From an analytical standpoint, Canada’s stabilization mission in Afghanistan was an 
incredible feat of commitment ultimately resulting in failure from a coalition perspective. 
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Twelve and a half years had passed, $18 billion CAD was spent, and most importantly 159 
Canadian military personnel had been killed during the conflict as a result (Canadian 
Encyclopaedia, 2019). Although their enemy was largely defeated in the opening stages of 
the conflict, the progressive resurgence of the Taliban throughout Afghanistan provided a 
sizable challenge to the coalition in the years following the Taliban government collapse in 
2001. Canada in particular was understrength in terms of personnel, insufficiently equipped 
as it pertained to vehicles and capacity and finally ill-prepared (Boucher & Nassal, 2017, pg. 
23) to take on a ‘peacebuilding’ approach to Afghanistan involving all levels of government. 
Even with a narrower approach with increased priorities and an increased focus on security 
force capability, Canada and its coalition allies were unable to defeat the Taliban and put an 
end to armed conflict or stabilize the country. Canada ended their leading role in Kandahar 
Province in 2011. Even with what Rotmann would describe as stabilization-as-crisis-
management as a benchmark for the stabilization mission, it was too little, too late. 
      How the mission has been presented to the public since its termination by the 
Canadian Government is also of interest. For this essay, acquiring public documentation was 
not impossible, however it did require more in-depth effort to dig deep into Federal 
Government websites and archives. To acquire a copy of the Manley report for example, an 
ocean of “404 - Page Not Found” errors flood government website links claiming to lead to 
the report. It was only after professional research assistance and a deep dive inside the 
Library and Archives Canada website, that the report was found. Additionally, through 
government and department changes since the end of the mission, websites have not been 
kept up and consistently dead ends of information would halt research. With this, there also 
existed inconsistency of information, most notably with the early stages. As Boucher and 
Nassal along with others emphasize, JTF2 members were on the ground from the start of the 
mission in Fall of 2001 however, for some Government of Canada accounts of the mission, 
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there is no mention of their involvement in the opening stages of the mission (Boucher & 
Nassal, 2017, pg. 16 and Government of Canada, 2014). Recently as well, the Canadian 
Government was criticized for not including the families of the fallen Canadian soldiers in 
the conflict for the unveiling of the Afghan War Memorial in Ottawa (Brewster, 2019). The 
initial unveiling was kept under the radar until what had happened became public, and a 
second unveiling was to be planned to include the families (Brewster, 2019). Unlike some of 
Canada’s other armed conflicts, Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan does not appear to be 
something the Federal Government or the CAF wants in the public eye.  
          Canada’s lack of transparency with the mission in Afghanistan is in-line with 
Rotmann’s position that states who engage in stabilization efforts often “have evaded the 
pressure to define and explain their work” (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 2). As Rotmann underscores, 
Canada’s official stabilization document appears as more of a public relations piece than a 
form of operating procedure (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 2). He even cites Canada’s challenges with 
communication during the conflict in Afghanistan which provided a challenge for political 
actors from both political parties during Canada’s mission. Rotmann concludes that in order 
to be successful, stabilization missions must include an effective communication strategy 
(Rotmann, 2016, pg. 8) and the Canadian Government’s lack of transparency with the 
mission appears to be in stark contrast to what Rotmann argues should be the case. 
Conclusion 
            On October 7th, 2001 when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien committed Canadian air, 
naval and ground forces to the American Operation Enduring Freedom, it would begin an 
involvement in an armed conflict for which Canada would unknowingly be committed for a 
further twelve years. Initially as a response to the September 11th attacks, Canada’s 
multifaceted and complex mission concluded with three main Operations, Apollo, Athena 
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and Attention (Government of Canada, 2014). Canada’s mission in Afghanistan would be the 
country’s longest military engagement in its history and would withstand casualties unseen 
since the Korean War (Tremblay & Pahlavi, 2013, pg. 72). This ‘stabilization’ mission led 
heavily by the United States and NATO encompassed almost the entirety of Afghanistan in 
an effort to rid the country of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and to then develop Afghanistan and 
rid it of its economic and developmental strife. 
        For this essay, it was critical to understand the concept of stabilization and position it 
in a way that could allow Canada’s mission in Afghanistan from start to finish to be evaluated 
and determine what went well and what went wrong. Firstly, with Call and Cousens, the 
traditional, broad concept of peacebuilding was unpacked to observe its main principles 
toward institutionalizing peace and increasing state capacity. As a sub-term to this, 
statebuilding was introduced to view the all-encompassing practice of a full-scale 
development of the state with an end goal of moving it toward a point of self-sufficiency 
(Call & Cousens, 2008). Rotmann’s first presentation of stabilization-as-peacebuilding drew 
parallels with these earlier concepts of ‘statebuilding’ and ‘peacebuilding’. However, his 
analysis was critical of these concepts for what he referred to as a ‘limitlessness’ approach to 
international involvement. The peacebuilding form of stabilization aimed at incorporating 
‘whole-of-government’ practices sought to bring in numerous groups of experts and drew 
from a broad range of knowledge. For some governments, this became too impractical as it 
was aimed at being all-encompassing. There existed seldom clear priorities and direction to 
accomplish the end goal of institutionalizing peace (Rotmann, 2016). 
      Rotmann highlighted how some governments moved to a stabilization-as-crisis- 
management model. This more narrowed approach seeks to bring an end to armed conflict 
and support lasting peace by increasing state capacity to be resilient to political shock. With 
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this, the role of the security forces is heavily valued as the main tool to counter dangerous 
threats to political stability. Military and police forces play a larger role than the government 
and development actors (Rotmann, 2016). Mac Ginty, as was highlighted, criticized this 
narrow approach as the humanitarian and development sectors were often left behind. 
Additionally, Mac Ginty contended that the narrow application of stabilization often has less 
to do with achieving certain outcomes then it does with waning enthusiasm from the 
international stabilizers. In this essay however, this narrow lens was chosen to examine 
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, not because the Canadian Government followed what 
would resemble stabilization-as-crisis-management but because in the end they neglected to 
follow this approach directly enough. 
       For Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, its first phase, Operation Apollo, Canadian 
units intermixed with American ones and fought to quickly oust the Taliban from 
Afghanistan. Once the threat had been minimized, the interim government established in 
Kabul under Karzai was guided and aided heavily by coalition forces including Canada. The 
CAF continued security efforts to secure Kabul and the surrounding area while the Federal 
Government applied their ‘whole-of-government’ approach to building up Afghanistan's 
capacity. With their switch to Kandahar Province and the implementation of the KPRT, the 
Federal Government and the CAF continued this model of stabilization. Both the Federal 
Government and the CAF experienced challenges when using this model. The expansive 
reach of the Federal Government departments operating within Afghanistan required the 
security role of the CAF to be on point to provide protection to not only their workers but to 
the Afghan people in an effort to show that the Afghan government was effective in 
protecting its citizens and stabilizing its country. 
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           Challenges to the success of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan were also tied to the 
domestic political situation with a less-than-enthused Prime Minister, Paul Martin. However, 
the election of the Conservative government in 2006 led by PM Harper led to a renewed 
commitment. Evidence of this renewed commitment came in the form of the Independent 
Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (2008) chaired by John Manley. 
       The Panel presented a number of recommendations to the Canadian Government to 
which sought to address some of the challenges faced by the mission in Afghanistan, such as 
a lack of concrete priorities and direction along with security issues such as troop shortages 
and equipment discrepancies. The Harper Government addressed many of the 
recommendations and with this Canada’s mission began to focus a bit more on what its goals 
were and how they were to accomplish them with the help of their allies. In 2011, Canada’s 
more narrowed down mission in Kandahar Province came to an end with a number of 
focused projects incomplete and the Taliban threat still rampant. Canada would remain in 
Afghanistan, now in Kabul until 2014 in order to provide training to the ANA and police 
forces and increase their capacity. However Canadian forces did not conduct combat 
operations in the same manner as before (Boucher & Nassal, 2017). 
       Examining this mission through Rotmann’s narrow lens on stabilization allowed 
this essay to underline many of the key failures of the mission. Although commendable that it 
was realized by the independent panel that the mission in Afghanistan needed to be more 
focused, it chose to centre around many development projects with the Dahla Dam, 
education, and countering the polio problem in the country. The security threat in 
Afghanistan never went away and became worse as the years went on. This slowed progress 
on these projects and by the time the Canadians pulled out of Kandahar, they remained 
unfinished. Because of this, the Canadian Government has not been active in trying to present 
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Afghanistan as a proud moment in Canadian history like it does for say Vimy Ridge or Juno 
Beach. 
   A dark chapter in Canada’s contemporary history, Afghanistan continues to be a 
reminder of the complexity of foreign intervention in a contemporary setting. Stabilization 
has been, as the quotation from Rotmann used previously stated, a “mainstream catch phrase 
-for what to do when high levels of political volatility and violence lead to humanitarian and 
political crises in ‘some place’” (Rotmann, 2016, pg. 1). With this, stabilization has been 
chosen as a manner used to analyse and evaluate foreign involvement missions. This essay 
examined Canada’s mission in Afghanistan with Rotmann’s two concepts of stabilization: 
stabilization- as-peacebuilding and then stabilization-as-crisis-management. Canada’s 
mission was found to have embodied the first concept and the challenges that arose were in 
line with Rotmann’s critique of this approach. Following the Manley Report, the narrowed 
approach still appeared to be a challenge for the Canadian mission and that of its allies.  
       Canada’s mission in Afghanistan was one that occupied much of Canada’s foreign policy 
conversation for the first decade of the 21st century. Canada’s mission was a defining one for 
the CAF and the Canadian Government not in its success but in its failures. As the Taliban 
and coalition allies consider ongoing talks of peace and a cessation of conflict (Global New, 
2020 & What’s in Blue 2020) Canada’s twelve-and-a-half-year mission will continue to be 
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